Tawassul and Istighatha in al-Nuqul al-Sharʿiyya and al-Haqaʾiq al-Islamiyya

The point of contention

Seeking intercession through prophets and righteous people (tawassul) and appealing to them for aid (istighatha) is one of the main themes of the refutations directed at the Wahhabi movement. This article approaches it through two works: "al-Nuqul al-Sharʿiyya fi al-Radd ʿala al-Wahhabiyya" by Shaykh Hasan al-Shatti al-Hanbali (d. 1274/1858), and "al-Haqaʾiq al-Islamiyya fi al-Radd ʿala al-Mazaʿim al-Wahhabiyya" by al-Hajj Malik Ba ibn al-Shaykh Dawud. Neither book confines itself to arguing from scripture; both quote earlier scholars extensively, and that is our focus here.

The meaning of "duʿaʾ" in the verses

The author of "al-Haqaʾiq al-Islamiyya" holds that part of the dispute is linguistic: the word "duʿaʾ" in the Qur'an covers several meanings, including worship, calling, asking and naming, and the verses forbidding one to "call upon" other than God refer, in his view, to worship. He concludes:

"It has been established that the meaning of tawassul differs from the meaning of worship, both linguistically and in the Law."^[1]

From this he infers that applying those verses to people who practise tawassul removes them from their proper context, and that no such analogy can justify declaring those Muslims unbelievers.

Hanbali texts in al-Shatti

Al-Shatti devotes the "fourth discourse" of his book to the permissibility of tawassul, seeking help and seeking intercession through the prophets, saints and righteous, both during their lives and after their deaths; he argues from the Qur'an and Sunna and then from "the statements of the jurists". Being a Hanbali, he begins with the texts of his own school, quoting al-Buhuti and Ibn al-Jawzi, and then Imam Ahmad himself:

"Imam Ahmad said in his manual of pilgrimage rites, which he wrote for al-Marrudhi, that one seeks the Prophet's intercession with God Most High."^[2]

In the same place he notes that Ibn Muflih allowed it in his commentary on the rites of al-Muqniʿ, that Marʿi al-Karmi wrote in "Dalil al-Talib": "Tawassul through the righteous is permissible", and that its commentator cited ʿUmar's prayer for rain through al-ʿAbbas. Al-Shatti points out that the same is found in the pilgrimage manual of Shaykh Sulayman ibn ʿAli, the grandfather of Shaykh Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab.

Al-Shatti's reading of Ibn Taymiyya

Al-Shatti reports al-Subki's statement that no one among earlier or later scholars had objected to tawassul and istighatha through the Prophet until Ibn Taymiyya came, but he immediately offers a more careful reading:

"Ibn Taymiyya did not forbid tawassul and seeking intercession."^[3]

He explains that what Ibn Taymiyya forbade — as al-Shatti understands him — is asking for what only God can grant, such as forgiveness of sins, guidance of hearts or sending down rain, and that Ibn Taymiyya himself cited the hadith of the blind man in connection with tawassul. On the same page he relates Qadi ʿIyad's account in "al-Shifa" of the exchange between Imam Malik and the caliph Abu Jaʿfar al-Mansur in the Prophet's Mosque, in which Malik says of the Prophet that he is "your means and the means of your father Adam".

The synthesis of the four schools

After citing Hanafi texts, such as al-Shurunbulali on the etiquette of visitation, together with Shafiʿi and Maliki texts, al-Shatti concludes that:

"The jurists of the four imams permitted tawassul, seeking intercession and seeking aid through the prophets and the righteous without restriction."^[4]

He bases this on what the jurists mention in works on pilgrimage rites: that it is recommended, when visiting, to face the noble grave and to seek the Prophet's intercession with God for forgiveness of sins and the fulfilment of needs.

The doctrinal criterion and ambiguous expressions

Both books agree that the ruling turns on belief, not on wording alone. The author of "al-Haqaʾiq al-Islamiyya" acknowledges that the opponents have a valid point regarding blocking the means to harm (sadd al-dharaʾiʿ):

"Yes, we agree with these opponents in one respect and support them in preventing ordinary people from those extreme excesses."^[5]

But this, he argues, calls for teaching ordinary people proper decorum in their expressions, not declaring them unbelievers or banning tawassul altogether; the ambiguous expressions they use should be understood as figurative attribution (majaz ʿaqli), as when one says "the medicine benefited me". Al-Shatti makes the same point when he treats the fact that such words come from a monotheist as an indication that they are figurative. The author of "al-Haqaʾiq" then sets out the criterion on which the whole question turns:

"What is legally prohibited in tawassul is believing in an efficacy coming from anyone other than God."^[6]

By this he means that whoever believes a prophet, saint or anyone else has independent efficacy has fallen into what is agreed to be forbidden; whoever does not believe this is not harmed, in his view, by tawassul or istighatha as such.

Conclusion

The two books present tawassul and istighatha as a question attested in the texts of the four schools, and hold that disagreement over it, however sharp, does not justify declaring Muslims unbelievers. The reader will note that al-Shatti is careful in his reading of Ibn Taymiyya, distinguishing what he forbade from what he allowed, and that the author of "al-Haqaʾiq" recognises the merit of objecting to certain verbal excesses: for both, the matter is one of regulation and instruction before it is one of faith and unbelief.